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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
5)	
6	vs.) CR No. 11-10260-NMG	
7)	
8	AARON SWARTZ)	
9		
10 11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE NATHANIEL M. GORTON	
12	STATUS CONFERENCE	
13	OTHER CONTENTS	
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15	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
16	Courtroom No. 4 One Courthouse Way	
17	Boston, MA 02210 Friday, December 14, 2012	
18	2:08 p.m.	
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20	Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR	
21	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
22	One Courthouse Way, Room 3209 Boston, MA 02210	
23	Mechanical Steno - Transcript by Computer	
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APPEARANCES: OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY By: Stephen P. Heymann, AUSA One Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts 02210. On Behalf of the Government. CLEMENTS & PINEAULT, LLP By: Michael J. Pineault, Esq. 24 Federal Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110. - and -KEKER & VAN NEST LLP By: Elliot R. Peters, Esq., and Daniel E. Purcell, Esq. (By Telephone) 633 Battery Street San Francisco, California 94111 On Behalf of the Defendant.

1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: United States vs. Aaron Swartz, Criminal 2 No. 11-10260. Court is in session. You may be seated. 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. I understand --4 5 do we have somebody on the phone? 6 MR. PURCELL: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. And that would be? 7 MR. PURCELL: This is Dan Purcell from Keker & Van 8 Nest. I'm one of the lawyers representing the defendant, Aaron 9 Swartz. 02:08 10 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Purcell. 12 courtroom we have -- starting on my left? 13 MR. HEYMANN: Your Honor, Steve Heymann on behalf of 14 the government. 1.5 THE COURT: Mr. Heymann. 16 MR. PETERS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Elliot Peters, appearing on behalf of Aaron Swartz, who is present and 17 sitting right here. 18 19 THE COURT: Mr. Peters and Mr. Swartz. And? 02:09 20 MR. PINEAULT: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael 21 Pineault from Clements & Pineault, also for Aaron Swartz. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Pineault, good afternoon to you. 23 We are here at the request of -- the joint request of counsel that we have a status conference to determine whether 24 25 or not an evidentiary hearing on the several pending motions to

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suppress would be appropriate and, if so, what the scope of such a hearing might be.

I have reviewed the papers that have been filed in this regard, and I think maybe I could start by asking Mr.

Peters to explain to the Court why it is that we need such a hearing and on what particular issues do you feel there needs to be evidence presented?

MR. PETERS: Thank you, your Honor. I think that there's three issues that require an evidentiary hearing. One is, there's a motion that we filed relating to a 34-day delay in obtaining search warrants to search a computer and two electronic storage devices. The government has responded with various factual arguments about why that delay is reasonable. I suppose your Honor could grant that motion without a hearing, but in order to entertain the government's arguments and explanations, I think that there would have to be fact-finding about the claims of reasonability with respect to that delay. That's one.

Two is, there's an argument that's been put forth by the government that Mr. Swartz was a trespasser on the MIT campus, both in the context of using the MIT computer network as a guest and also in being physically present in a building and in a room on the campus. That is a factual issue, also, that would require the taking of testimony about MIT's policies and procedures. It has a somewhat unusual open policy to its

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campus. It has an open computer network. So we believe the testimony would prove that the government's claim that he was a trespasser is not accurate in the context of this search warrant.

And then the third topic, your Honor, would be the issue of whether Mr. Swartz had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer that was left on the MIT campus, in a room on the MIT campus. The government takes the position that no one could have such an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. And for some of the reasons that -- it overlaps a little bit with some of the trespasser issues. It's our view that he did, and certainly could have had, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy based on how the MIT campus works and so on. So I think those are the three main issues that --

THE COURT: How do you respond to the government's position that this is really just a pretrial in which you get a free discovery of all of the government's evidence?

MR. PETERS: Well, I guess the simplest way to respond is to say that that's not the way we're thinking. We filed these motions because we believe that they have merit. And I think the first one I mentioned -- I think it would be possible for the Court to grant our motion about the 34-day delay in seeking a warrant without having a fact hearing, but I can represent to your Honor that we're here to litigate these

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motions to suppress and not for some reason that has nothing to do with that. And, obviously, in a suppression hearing, if they objected and your Honor concluded that we were pursuing lines of inquiry unrelated to the suppression motion, which we have no intention of doing, your Honor would sustain an objection and tell us what to do, and that would be the end of that. I think there's very little risk of that, and that's certainly not our intention.

The investigation in this case took place in a way where the government chose not to seek court approval for a lot of its actions. They finally got a warrant much later, but they didn't get any type of Title III or warrant or anything beforehand, and so it can't really be a surprise to them that we would assert our rights to seek to suppress some of the fruits of these seizures which took place without judicial authorization. And that's all we seek to do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Heymann, why shouldn't I allow such a hearing to the extent that the defendants have requested it?

MR. HEYMANN: Your Honor, if I may, let me address them sequentially. The first, with respect to the delay on the search warrant, I won't reargue the government's position that there is no need to have a hearing on that simply because the evidence was seized and held as physical objects and as evidence, and the Court can make its decision based solely on that point. And I think that point is uncontested.

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But to the extent that the Court wishes additional fact-finding on the question of why there was that 34-day period and for the Court to have a complete picture as it makes its ruling, that set of facts is a very modest set of facts and quite constrained. It's the question of putting an agent on the stand and saying what's going on in that intervening time. As the government said, and we'll argue later, it's not necessary to reach that point, but it's a fairly constrained set of facts.

With respect to where the hearing would move from a hearing that is directed to factual matters that would inform the Court to a pretrial trial of the case is on this question of the trespasser. And I want to distinguish two parts here: the question of whether or not there was legitimate access to the physical campus or the physical room on the physical campus and the question of whether or not there was legitimate access to the network.

There is no -- because the government is not going to seek to offer in evidence the -- what has been alternately referred to as the packet capture, the mirroring of the communications going back and forth -- the monitoring of the communications going back and forth to the laptop for about a day and a half -- because the government is not going to seek to offer that, because it had no -- while there unquestionably is a couple of emails saying, We've seen this and we've seen

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that, the government -- I literally don't have a very good idea what was even in that packet capture. Because it was not used in the investigation -- it wasn't used in any further search or warrant or collection -- there is no reason to address that packet capture.

We candidly addressed it because we wanted to show what MIT was doing was perfectly proper, perfectly legitimate; what the government was doing was perfectly proper, perfectly legitimate. But that packet capture evidence is not going to be offered. What is derivative from it is not going to be offered. There isn't anything derivative from it. That's why it's not going to be offered.

So the sole question there is whether or not the routing, addressing information, the stuff that looks like pen register information except it's a computer, that's routinely collected by MIT and routinely collected on their network, can be provided. It's the government's position that that is wholly resolvable as a matter of law. It's been resolved by Forrester in the Ninth Circuit as a matter of law. It was resolved by Miller by the Supreme Court.

Once you do that, there is the whole extensive part of the trial, which is what -- how did he get on the network? Was it legitimate? Was it illegitimate depending on whose perspective you're looking at it from?, doesn't get replayed.

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That part, the Court does not need an evidentiary hearing on because, for all the reasons we argue in our brief, that's not necessary.

THE COURT: But you're not opposing an evidentiary hearing as to whether there was a physical trespass in the so-called closet or on the premises of MIT?

MR. HEYMANN: What I was going to go on to say is that what is -- what remains, which is his third question, the reasonable expectation of privacy of the laptop and the hard drive and the closet, the question of: What did the government do when it got -- how did -- the government goes in. It sees -- it's shown a box by MIT employees. It goes under the box. It looks at things. What is the government doing that is -- as Mr. Peters says, there is an activity that either is or is not a Fourth Amendment cognizable search going on then. And if it is a Fourth Amendment cognizable search, there either is or is not an exception.

That is, again, a fairly concise amount of facts; that while the government does not believe it's necessary to go in in great detail for the reasons that it's argued, it's perfectly reasonable to have a constrained hearing so that the Court has -- is fully informed as to what took place there and the nuances of what was seen by different people at different times. Obviously, there's photographs of that.

So, in sum, where this expands is the moment you get

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into the whole history of what's going on and off the network, which is not necessary to go into to resolve the matters before the Court.

THE COURT: What about the abandonment issue?

MR. HEYMANN: Again, that's a physical question. It's a question -- these are the -- these are the -- differentiating between what is happening, as it were, in the physical world, what's being -- are there "no trespassing" signs up? Where is this closet? How do you get into this closet? Is it locked? Is it not locked? What do you see when you go in? What did the government do physically when it went in? What did it see? What did it know? Did it open something? Not open something? Those set of physical facts are a different set of facts than what was he doing on the network at the time, which is the heart of the trial itself.

THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the government's position. You would then say that there ought not to be any evidentiary hearing with respect to what expectations of privacy, if any, a guest user obtained through access to the MIT's network?

MR. HEYMANN: We've certainly argued in, I think, our fourth- or fifth-level argument with respect to the motion to dismiss, No. 1, the motion -- motion to dismiss, I'm sorry -- motion to suppression, No. 1, that because he was a trespasser on the network, he also didn't have any right of privacy. But

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that whole thing is resolved, I submit to the Court, at the constitutional level and at the statutory level long before you get down there.

THE COURT: All right. I'll give Mr. Peters a chance
-- a brief chance to rebut and tell me why what Mr. Heymann
says doesn't make good sense; in other words, have a limited
evidentiary hearing with respect to the physicality, if you
will, of trespass and/or abandonment but not beyond that.

MR. PETERS: Well, first of all, the first point is the issue about the delay on the search warrant, and what Mr. Heymann said was --

THE COURT: Why isn't that a matter of law?

MR. PETERS: I think it could be a matter of law
because the law says that a delay of that amount in even
seeking a search warrant is a basis for a suppression. Their
response is factual. So I think if it were purely a matter of
law, then the Court would have to grant the suppression motion.
But the government's arguments against it are factual.

THE COURT: You agree with that, Mr. Heymann?

MR. HEYMANN: Your Honor, I don't agree with that. I

think the -- the government's position, just to put the facts

on the table, is simply that there's a -- I ask Mr. Peters to

bear with me on this -- that there has been a theft of data

from JSTOR. You can follow it down the wires. It connects to

a laptop. It connects to a hard drive. There are pictures of

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his client -- again, I ask him to bear with me -- getting this laptop, getting this hard drive. And for that reason, those objects are physically evidence of the crime, and we could simply seize it and keep them until trial for that reason, and that distinguishes his whole line of cases.

But I think that this area is one that is so easy, in the course of an evidentiary hearing, to put on what was found, where, to be able to put on before the Court the evidence that the wires coming down comes into the laptop, comes into the hard drive, so that the Court has that image in front of it as it's assessing the government's argument; to hear, to the extent that the Court wants to, what's going on in the investigation in the intervening time. The government contends it's not material, but the Court would have that evidence to assess should it want to.

It's such a small piece that we should go ahead and do it as part of the factual hearing that he's requesting. I don't think it's necessary. I just think it's benign.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Peters.

MR. PETERS: It sounds like we agree that there should be a hearing about that.

I just wanted to make one observation. The argument that this is a physical object, that the computer -- you know, the computer's evidentiary significance is just because it's a physical object, like a gun, say. We just disagree with that,

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your Honor. The evidentiary significance of a computer is what's inside it. The evidence that they hope to offer is the result of a search because -- which we claim was unlawful because of the delay in getting the warrant, which took place of the contents, the hard drive, what was on that computer. If all they wanted to offer was the fact that here's a computer and put it into evidence, they wouldn't bother, and we wouldn't have a problem.

What we're here moving to suppress is a search of the hard drive and the extraction of a bunch of data off that computer, which we contend took place in violation of the Constitution because of the delay. And the arguments that the government's making, and I think that Mr. Heymann's presentation kind of underscores that, are factual.

THE COURT: All right. I --

MR. PETERS: But -- I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: I thought you'd finished. But go ahead.

MR. PETERS: No. I wanted to turn to the trespasser issue and the expectation of privacy issue are also factual issues that turn on access to the building, access to the room, I mean, what happened in connection with the activities that are alleged and then that give rise to the searches that took place without a court order. And I really don't hear Mr. Heymann disagreeing with us about that either. He keeps talking about a narrow -- you know, a circumscribed hearing.

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And we don't have any anticipation of coming into your Honor's courtroom and trying to ask a lot of questions that aren't directed to the appropriate matter of the hearing. There may be some overlap between issues that the jury would have to determine and the issues that the Court has to consider in connection with a suppression hearing, but I think that's common in a criminal case when you have some constitutional issues in a suppression motion. But we would -- we're here to focus on and litigate the issues presented by the motion.

THE COURT: I think I've heard enough about that. I agree that the Court will have a limited, circumscribed evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress. The Court is entering into a time of unbelievably busy trials next month and for the several months thereafter. So I am — this is not going to be an unlimited hearing. It's going to be limited in time.

And, really, I've looked at my calendar before I came on the bench, and the only day I have available in the next time frame that would be appropriate for this is the last Friday of January. That's January 25th. And the afternoon thereof is what I am going to make available for this hearing. In other words, it's not going to exceed three hours or so; and, therefore, the time will have to be divided between the two parties so that you can order whatever facts you want to get before me in such a way as to allow your opponent equal

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time but get it done in three hours. So we'll start either at -- I suppose we could start at 1:00 on Friday, January 25th.

And we will be done with this hearing before the end of the afternoon, hopefully, by 4:00 but, if not, before 5:00.

And the issues, I am going to limit to what Mr. Heymann outlined with respect to the delay in getting the search warrant and the facts that he believes will demonstrate the appropriate behavior of the government; the trespass issue and what I have defined as the abandonment issue, involving the computer that was left in the closet. I don't know whether that will actually get around to a concern of the objectivity of the reasonable expectation of privacy, but I'm not going to decide that right at this moment. But the hearing is, I think, obviously going to be a limited one, and we will then go forward from there.

I understand that both sides feel that at that stage a trial on February 4th is going to be impossible. I agree with that, but I also have to forewarn counsel that my schedule over the next six months is so busy that I don't have a lot of options. And I'm not going to put this trial off until June, as requested by the defendant. There's no reason for a six-month delay. There is reason for some delay.

With respect to the request of designating experts, I think that was one you wanted until the end of February. I'm going to split the difference with you, Mr. Peters, and give

1 you till -- maybe till the date of the hearing that we're going to have, January, to designate your experts. But the trial --2 the only day that I'm going to be able to afford for this trial 3 that's not February 4th which, of course, we've blocked out, is 4 5 the very first day of April, April 1st, which is a Monday. I 6 don't know how long this trial is expected to last. What is 7 your best guess, Mr. Heymann? MR. HEYMANN: Less than two weeks -- less than ten 8 9 trial days, but how many depends on the defense case and how 02:30 10 much cross-examination. But we certainly can accomplish it 11 within ten days. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Peters. 13 MR. HEYMANN: Ten trial days. 14 MR. PETERS: That sounds right, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. That's what I intend to do. 16 there any problem with the expressed intentions of the Court? 17 Mr. Heymann? 18 MR. HEYMANN: First of all, with respect to 19 scheduling, I already conferred with my co-counsel, Mr. Scott, who -- Mr. Scott -- Mr. Garland, Scott Garland, who couldn't be 02:30 20 2.1 here today, and that works fine with both of our schedules. 22 And when the Court said the trespass issue, I just 23 want to make sure I'm focused -- are we focusing on the 24 physical trespass. 25 THE COURT: Yes. We're focusing on the physical

trespass, not the computer aspect of it.

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MR. HEYMANN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Peters.

MR. PETERS: Your Honor, I'm just double-checking my calendar. I turned off my device in court because I find it always rings if I leave it on. So I think it's silenced, so I just turned it off. If your Honor could just bear with me. I think that those dates are fine with me, but I just wanted to double-check.

THE COURT: Yes. I'll give you a minute.

MR. PETERS: Your Honor, thank you for your patience. Those dates are fine with us.

THE COURT: I perhaps cut you off, Mr. Peters, when we were discussing the potential issue of what expectations of privacy, if any, a guest user obtained through access to the MIT's network and whether or not that would necessarily be a subject matter of any evidentiary hearing. Had you completed your remarks in that regard?

MR. PETERS: I think I had, your Honor. The only source of some confusion in my mind was that I heard Mr. Heymann say -- and I'm trying not to put words in his mouth, but the evidence about the packet capture may not be used because, in the motions, there were certain things in the government's opposition that they clearly identified and said, We're not going to put that in in our case in chief.

THE COURT: I think he just repeated that here today.

MR. PETERS: The packet capture wasn't one of those
things. I just wanted to know whether that was a different
position.

THE COURT: Mr. Heymann.

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MR. HEYMANN: No. To be -- at the risk of restating it to be clear, the government does not intend to offer in its case in chief any of the evidence that was obtained through the packet capture. And I just want to be clear as to which packet capture in case that's an issue. On January 4th when the computer -- when the laptop computer was found, first MIT on its own, as we understand it, though there's a little bit of ambiguity about that, and then certainly shortly thereafter with the approval of the government, started monitoring, making an exact duplicate of all the communications going back and forth to the Acer laptop for a day. Those communications, which we've referred to in the briefing as the packet capture, are not going to be offered in evidence in the government's case in chief.

I want to just be very clear that we are intending to offer significant amounts of the information that shows the routing information, the tracking information, the sign-on information, all of the non-content information. But the government --

THE COURT: The so-called pen register information?

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MR. HEYMANN: Part of it -- I refer to it as pen -the computer version of pen register information. But it's also like, when somebody signs on and they say, My name is such and such and my address is such and such, they're providing information. That non-content information, or that information voluntarily given to the network, we do intend to offer. THE COURT: Okay. I think that's clear. MR. PETERS: It is clear now, your Honor. Thank you. And so I do think the issue of a reasonable expectation of privacy as part of Fourth Amendment standing then isn't in play with respect to the access to the computer system. THE COURT: Now, before we adjourn, you have filed a separate matter, but -- you have filed a motion to dismiss, Mr. Peters, the fraud count -- actually, the two counts that have -- that relate in that regard. Rather than schedule another hearing -- you may not be prepared today, but I would hear both sides briefly if you wish to supplement the papers that you have filed with the Court with respect to the motion to dismiss, which is No. -- Docket No. 64, the wire fraud counts. Do you wish to supplement your papers at all, Mr. Peters? MR. PETERS: No, your Honor. We'll submit the matter based on the papers that we filed. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Heymann? MR. HEYMANN: As will we, your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. I will take that matter under

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          advisement and try to resolve that as -- in due course, before
          the hearing of the -- involving the motions to suppress.
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                    Is there anything else that needs to come to my
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          attention before we recess for the day.
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                   MR. PETERS: Only that in light of the Court's busy
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          schedule that you have a happy holiday.
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                   THE COURT: Thank you. You too.
                   MR. HEYMANN: Thank you, your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: I take it you're not here for ulterior
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          motives, to attend the football game on Sunday night?
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                   MR. PETERS: I don't want to get myself in trouble
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          with anybody. Actually, your Honor, I'm hoping to go back and
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          attend my law firm's Christmas party in San Francisco this
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          evening.
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                   THE COURT: I think that's a better choice for a 49ers
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          fan.
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                   MR. PETERS: It should be a heck of a game, though.
                   THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. We have another
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    19
          hearing.
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                   MR. PETERS: Thank you very much, your Honor.
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           (Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m. the hearing concluded.)
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<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my skill and ability.

/s/Cheryl Dahlstrom

02/22/2013

Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR Dated

Official Court Reporter